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The polycentricity approach and the research challenges 
confronting environmental governance 
Andreas Thiel (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) 
Abstract 
Literature on environmental governance has shown renewed interest in polycentricity and 
polycentric governance, a perspective that has been first suggested by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom 
throughout studies of metropolitan governance in the sixties. This paper is to provide greater clarity 
to the recent discussions of polycentricity by introducing the polycentricity approach based on the 
different roles that the concepts of polycentricity and polycentric governance and associated 
theoretical claims adopt in research on environmental governance. The polycentricity approach aims 
to connect these perspectives in a coherent way. Based on revisiting the Ostroms’ writings on 
polycentricity, I distinguish between its use as ontological, operationalizing and sensitizing concept, 
as normative and positive theory, and as analytical framework. I use these perspectives to review the 
literature on environmental governance that relates to polycentric governance. The distinction of 
uses of concepts proves helpful to organize the literature and uncover research gaps. These gaps are: 
the role of constitutional and meta-constitutional rules and social problem characteristics for 
polycentric governance, ways to distinguish the domain of overarching rules and the domain of 
polycentric governance, the way polycentric governance shapes public agents’ behavior in acts of 
public service provision, and the relation between constitutional rules, polycentric governance 
structures and innovative criteria to evaluate social-ecological system performance such as 
robustness, resilience, etc. The polycentricity approach allows us to coherently link these gaps in one 
framework guiding research. 
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1 Introduction 
The terms polycentricity and polycentric governance1 were introduced and elaborated by 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom in the sixties and seventies of the last century, representing an 
analytical concept that has been around for a long time but whose understanding has only 
partially been enhanced (Aligica 2014). Using these terms, research concerning the way 
nested sets of institutions (i.e. rules in use that describe regularized ways of behaviour of 
actors) shape the behaviour of interdependent actors and its performance has been 
developed. Specifically, those that first coined the terms, the Ostroms and the Bloomington 
school, set out to test this theory in the sixties and seventies through work on the structures 
shaping local public economies and Metropolitan governance, and, more specifically, 
policing (cf. Parks and Oakerson, 2000). McGinnis (2011), one of the core members of the 
Bloomington school2, defines governance as “process by which the repertoire of rules, 
norms, and strategies that guide behaviour within a given realm of policy interactions are 
formed, applied, interpreted, and reformed.” More concrete in relation to our object, the 
environment, Paavola (2007) defines environmental governanceas “the establishment, 
reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over environmental resources” in 
relation to all environmental resources and scales at which problems and solutions are 
defined. For him governance solutions reach beyond policy interactions, which is similarly 
one of the interests of polycentricity. The initial contribution by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 
(1961, 831) defines polycentric governance as follows:“Polycentric connotes many centers of 
decision-making which are formally independent of each other.… To the extent that they 
take each other into account in competitive relationships, …[they]…enter into various 
contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts…, the various political jurisdictions in a [functionally interlinked] …area may 
function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting 
behaviour. To the extent that this is said to be so, they may be said to function as a 
“system”.” To provide an empirical illustration of a system like this, some argue that the way 
the American federal state was set up is probably closest to the kind of polycentric society 
that the authors had in mind. This idea connotes an understanding of polycentricity as a 
descriptive concept (see below), which, given the way its key proponents developed it over 
time, later evolved into additional understandings of polycentricity as normative and 
positive theory and as analytical framework (see also my elaboration on these terms below). 
Based on this definition of governance and polycentric constellations, the overall 
polycentricity approach portrays a functionalist, ahistorical perspective on governance in 
contrast to the one of many European political scientists (Rhodes, 1995), which  investigates 
what makes specific kinds of governance emerge and what determines their functioning, 
performance and evolution. That way the polycentricity approach aims at theory building 
similar to fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972), polyarchy (Dahl, 1984), and functionalist 
                                                          
1 In this paper I use polycentricity and polycentric governance as synonymous.  
2 As Bloomington I consider scholars that develop their work in relation to the thinking developed by 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, founders of the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory 
and Policy Analysis 
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approaches to the analysis of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2004) and the 
explanation of its development (Putnam, 1988; Scharpf, 1997). However, while sharing 
certain features with all of these perspectives the approach also goes beyond them by 
proposing a more comprehensive perspective on the determining factors of governance and 
its performance. 
Recently, polycentricity, equated with polycentric governance, seems to experience renewed 
interest. A brief review through Scopus and Web of Knowledge confirms that since the 
beginning of the last decade its application has been increasing. Use of the concept is most 
prominent in planning studies addressing metropolitan areas and network types of 
governance. In these types of studies polycentricity refers to spatialized urban development 
and governance (models) in metropolitan areas (Giffinger and Suitner 2014). This is followed 
by environmental social sciences with the most prominent representative being Elinor 
Ostrom (Ostrom 2010c). Her much praised work on local common pool resource 
management is deeply grounded in the polycentricity approach. The polycentricity approach 
comprises of three distinct but interlinked elements. It is constituted by the descriptive 
concept of polycentric governance, a normative theory concerning what leads to polycentric 
governance which is considered desirable on the whole, a positive theory that hypothesizes 
what elements determine specific types of governance, and an analytical framework that 
aims to examine the explanatory and normative claims of positive and normative 
polycentricity theory. The overarching research interest of the approach, the interaction 
between institutions, behaviour of interdependent actors and its performance and 
methodological individualism provide the common core of the approach. These tenets are 
also shared by the successful Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
addressing the role of institutions in local collective action situations that Elinor Ostrom and 
colleagues built and applied extensively (Oakerson and Parks 2011).  
McGinnis and Ostrom (2012) reconstruct the development and basic theoretical tenets of 
the approach and the way it departed from its public choice origins. Specifically, the 
possibility of multiple rationalities of action and normative orientations and perceptions of 
agents, the role of entrepreneurship within a well-structured normative constitutional order 
in the interrelated public and private economic and political spheres, and reliance on a 
multiplicity of governance arrangements seem to crystallize as key features of the approach. 
Scholarship on social-ecological resilience was also greatly inspired by Ostrom’s work on 
common pool resources. It is of prevalent importance to the environment and social-
ecological systems, i.e. non-linear systems intricately linking social and ecological systems 
(Anderies et al., 2004). For either, polycentric governance is widely considered to be 
desirable, making social-ecological systems more resilient, adaptive and sustainable 
(Huitema et al., 2009). According to Schoon and colleagues (Schoon, Robards, Meek and 
Galaz, 2015), the polycentricity concept provides opportunities for enhanced learning and 
experimentation, it enables broader levels of participation, it improves connectivity across 
governance scales, it creates possibilities for response diversity and builds redundancy that 
can minimize and correct errors in governance. Even in policy-making circles polycentric 
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governance is increasingly being advocated – however, oftentimes it remains unclear what 
exactly the concept stands for in these discourses, and why it should be considered 
desirable.  
In this paper, I aim to present a more differentiated understanding of the way research 
grapples with polycentric governance by developing what I want to call “the polycentricity 
approach”. First, I pursue the questions what the different roles are that polycentricity 
adopts in research on environmental governance, if they can be connected to each other, 
and what the ensuing research is that emerges from such an overarching approach. This 
exposition is structured through an understanding of the terms concept, normative and 
positive theory and analytical framework to polycentric governance. Second, in order to 
examine this operationalization of the polycentricity approach, I review literature addressing 
environmental governance that refers to the term polycentricity and examine how it relates 
to the components of the polycentricity approach. The review will prove helpful for 
organizing this literature and allowing us to identify avenues for future research on 
environmental governance from the perspective of the polycentricity approach. 
2 A framework for discussing literature on polycentric governance  
To structure the discussion, I use three instruments of social science research: concept, 
analytical framework and theory. Following Blaikie (2000, 129), a concept expresses an idea 
in words (or symbols) that is used as building block in social science theories. “If the concept 
is clear as to what it refers, then sure identification of the empirical instances may be made” 
(Blumer 1969, 143 quoted by Blaikie 2000, 129). Blaikie distinguishes three roles of concepts: 
a) the ontological tradition associates concepts with a community of social scientists and 
identifies basic features of the social world; b) the operationalizing tradition turns concepts 
into variables in order to define them and develop ways of measuring them; c) the 
sensitizing use holds that concepts provide suggestions about what to look for and to search 
for commonalities between observations (Blaikie 2000, 130–140).  
As second class of social science instruments, analytical frameworks consist of a family of 
theories that adhere to common underlying assumptions, making them internally consistent 
(Blaikie 2000). An example of this understanding is Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework which provides a precursor to the application of game 
theoretical analysis of complex settings making. The IAD and game theory therefore share 
methodological individualism as a core tenet. Schlager (1999, 234) writes that such 
“[f]rameworks bound inquiry and direct attention of the analyst to critical features of the 
social and physical landscape. […] [T]hey specify classes of variables and general 
relationships among them, that is, how the general classes of variables loosely fit together 
into a coherent structure.” In this paper, the term analytical framework will be used where 
frameworks provide (constraining) cognitive (ontological) maps (Aligica 2006) but also adopt 
a sensitizing role.  
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Theories and frameworks are two interrelated but distinct instruments in social science. For 
the purpose of this paper, I adopt the understanding of theories of the Bloomington school. 
Thus, “explanation and prediction lie in the realm of theories” (Schlager 1999, 234; Ostrom 
2005). Theories “place value (only) on some of the variables identified as important in a 
framework, posit relationships among the variables, and make predictions about likely 
outcomes” (Schlager 1999, 240). We distinguish between normative theories that make 
hypothetical, value-laden statements about ways in which societies organize themselves in 
order to comply with certain performance criteria that are considered desirable, and 
descriptive, or positive theories that explain societal phenomena and performance. Below, I 
use this distinction in order to characterize different aspects of the polycentricity approach. 
In the following review of the way polycentricity and polycentric governance were portrayed 
by the Ostroms and the way they were used in literature on environmental governance, I will 
make use of the above-introduced perspectives. I argue that it is necessary to identify these 
different uses of the term polycentricity and to consider the interrelations between them in 
order to fully grasp the polycentricity approach. To summarize, the paper distinguishes the 
following use of the terms in relation to polycentricity:  
a) The concepts of polycentricity of governance or polycentric governance describe 
(polycentricity-related) structural features of static governance arrangements. These terms 
may be used in an ontological (what exists), operationalizing (how to measure what is 
assumed to exist) or sensitizing tradition (what may be interesting aspects to address in 
research).  
b) The normative theory of polycentricity refers to propositions about the interrelations 
between a set of conceptualized, presumed variables and their effect upon a specific, 
desirable outcome. The normative theory is based on the first publication on the subject by 
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961). It is not accepted or corroborated. This posits 
polycentricity as an endeavour in positive, explanatory theory development on 
environmental governance 
c) The polycentricity framework describes an analytical framework that consists of the 
conceptual building blocks that polycentric governance and its desired/hypothetical 
performance are embedded in. Causal relations and what are dependent and independent 
variables in the polycentricity framework are highly aggregated. This perspective could also 
be called the polycentricity lens because research needs to zoom in on specific components 
of overarching polycentricity theory.  
In what follows, I want to further elaborate on these components of the polycentricity 
approach and how they interrelate before I utilize this structure to review recent literature 
on environmental governance. 
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3 The concept of polycentric governance 
In its use as a concept, polycentric governance describes a specific, static structural 
configuration of governance. It is probably best captured through the original definition of 
polycentricity by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, 831) which was presented above. This 
definition aims to provide clues about whether a specific configuration of governance was 
polycentric. It is not interested in the dynamics of how it emerged, sustains or outlives itself.  
Van Zeben (2013) shows the multi-dimensionality of the concept. She describes its 
dimensions of multi-actor, cross-level and sectoral relations between functionally 
interrelated ways of resolving coordination and conflict for multiple purposes. She highlights 
that these institutionalized modes of interrelation need to be nested in an overarching 
structure of institutions. Due to its multi-dimensionality, the concept of structural (static) 
polycentricity is often equated only with a subset of the dimensions referred to above. Thus, 
governance configurations are called polycentric when multiple actors are involved, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the corresponding governance configuration also involves 
multiple levels and sectors. As a consequence, academics struggle with operationalizing the 
concept and measuring it (Aligica and Tarko 2012) because of its multi-dimensionality and 
comprehensiveness.3 For example Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014), informed also by other 
authors, break polycentric governance down in a way that many authors would follow 
nowadays: “Polycentric regimes combine distribution of power and authority with effective 
coordination among various centres and across spatial levels.” (see also: Ostrom 2010a; 
Folke et al. 2005). While such an approach is necessary because it makes it operationalizable 
for comparative work, it leaves out dimensions, such as the role of overarching rules, or 
multiple rationalities and purposes of actors and entrepreneurship.  
Specifically, the original publication of 1961 by Vincent Ostrom and colleagues posited that 
polycentric governance and its underlying conditions emerge somehow on the same level as 
decisions about provision and production. Thus, the causal structure underlying polycentric 
governance and its linkages to performance were not made explicit.  For example, they 
overlooked that polycentric governance would be intermediate to production and itself 
depend on constitutional and collective choice rules. Only later did the Ostroms disentangle 
preconditions of polycentricity,  what drives it on the one hand and its output and outcomes 
on the other (Ostrom 1999c). As a result, a comprehensive picture of what I want to call 
“positive and normative polycentricity theory” emerged.  
                                                          
3  It seems that most of the environmental management related literature we found throughout an 
extensive review of peer-reviewed literature, uses a reduced set of dimensions of the static structural 
concept of polycentricity either in an ontological, operationalizing or sensitizing way (cf. da Silveira and 
Richards (2013); Galaz et al. (2012); Gruby and Basurto (2014); Ostrom (2012); Sproule-Jones 
(2002)). 
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4 Polycentricity theory 
4.1 Normative polycentricity theory 
What I want to call normative polycentricity theory suggests what ideally needs to be in 
place for polycentric governance to emerge and what the virtues of polycentric governance 
are. In their first, seminal publication on polycentricity, Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) 
emphasised the structuralist (static) understanding of polycentric governance and 
postulated that it would lead to second best efficient production of public goods and/or 
exploiting economies of scale as a result of flexible, adaptive self-organisation among 
jurisdictions. The understanding implied: a) constant negotiation between efficiency in 
production and  alternative, normative values concerning provision and production of public 
goods, such as clean water, public safety, or the like; b) control, i.e. the determination of 
boundaries, so that the political jurisdiction includes the relevant set of events to be 
controlled; c) political representation, so that appropriate political interests are represented 
in decision-making arrangements; and d) that public enterprises will be controlled by the 
decisions of its constituents.  
Vincent Ostrom’s approach to polycentricity illustrates a meta-theory, distant from specific 
cases. The specific shape of governance he developed throughout later publications depends 
upon contingent, emergent dynamics and features of the setting. Whether or not polycentric 
governance emerges depends upon fulfillment of constitutional choice level conditions. 
Hereby following the understandings of the Bloomington School, constitutional level rules 
are defined as those rules that determine who in a community is eligible to make choices 
about who is entitled to make the rules according to which the community lives (Ostrom, 
2005). In what follows I describe a) V. Ostrom’s normative assumptions concerning 
constitutional rules and overarching institutional framework, and how they combine with b) 
the Ostroms’ ontological position concerning the characteristics of social problems and 
aspects of governance. These can be considered foundational for polycentric governance 
(4.1.1 and 4.1.2).  
To get to the elements of what I want to call normative polycentricity theory, the structural, 
static perspective on polycentric governance is embedded as follows: Precursors to the 
development of polycentric governance are compliance with specific constitutional 
prescriptions and overarching, non-polycentric rules (see table 1) and variability of social 
problem characteristics. Embedded in that way, polycentric governance will lead to tension 
where several performance criteria (a) efficiency, b) control, c) political representation, d) 
accountability) are continuously being traded off (see section 3; see figure 1). In such 
contexts, provision and production of public and common pool goods and services that does 
not satisfy expectations of consumers would be punished because actors could exit from the 
corresponding consumption-provision relation, or they could switch to or establish 
alternative organizations. If consumers were to self-organize this would bring spontaneous 
self-organization to the fore (i.e. what Ostrom 1980 has called public and private 
entrepreneur- or artisan-ship). That way, previous providers would be punished through 
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decrease in membership and/or (tax-like) contributions to the provision of public goods or 
services. 
Implicitly, at this early moment, Ostrom seems to presume intendedly rational actors 
(consumers and producers) (Simon 1962, 16 quoted by Williamson 1985, 45), and it is only 
later that the Ostroms make behavioral responses to institutions an object of their research 
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1999a, 107). Therefore, I separately elaborate on this perspective 
below. The normative theory of polycentricity can be considered a structuralist approach 
that emphasizes the competitive evolutionary selection of forms of organization for the 
provision and production of public goods and services as a result of (perceived) variations in 
characteristics of social problems and underlying constitutional (and meta-constitutional) 
conditions. McGinnis (2005, 13) aptly describes the resulting dynamic when he writes that 
“[a]s long as a polycentric system is in operation we should expect to observe unending 
processes of change and re-negotiation, as new collective entities are formed, old ones 
dissolve, and new bargains are arrived at to deal with an unending series of new issues of 
public policy. If this can be said to be an equilibrium, it is a radically dynamic one with 
nothing fixed except the underlying complexity of the system as a whole.”  
4.1.1 The ontological conditions at the origin of polycentric governance  
An ontological position describes what theorists presume to exist. In this regard, Vincent 
Ostrom holds that characteristics of societal problems greatly differ among each other which 
make them the root cause of polycentric governance. Against this background, one role of 
analysts is to uncover how specific characteristics of social problems shape the way they are 
best addressed. For example, Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) singled out characteristics 
of public goods along which they vary and which, from a welfarist perspective, can make 
provision and production a social problem. They address subtractable and non-subtractable 
goods (i.e. common pool resources and pure public goods) (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999b; 
Ostrom 2003; 2010a). These goods are characterized by externalities because of undue costs 
of excluding others from their effects, the spatial scale and associated (part of a) 
jurisdiction/subset of a community across which these positive or negative externalities 
extend, the packageability of the goods, and difficulties to measure input-output relations. 
As a result, public goods need to be financed through taxes although they could also be 
financed publicly (cf. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 832ff.). This brings us to the second 
ontological position, social heterogeneity, whose relevance has recently been re-emphasized 
by Aligica in his insightful treatment of the theoretical work of the Ostroms (Aligica 2014, 
4ff). He sees the Ostroms’ work to be crucially influenced by their attempt to devise a 
theoretical approach focusing on collectives which allows dealing with social heterogeneity: 
heterogeneity in capabilities, preferences, beliefs and information around which collective 
action may be organized, all of which also result in a variety of forms of governance for 
specific social problems, which, as such, are also more likely to represent a polycentric 
system. Such reasoning directly relates to Malik’s (2013) emphasis of the role of diverse 
social covenants in collective action, which can be seen as devices instrumental to the 
formation of collectives. The third ontological position refers to governance. Ostrom, 
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Tiebout and Warren (1961) introduce the notion of what  waslater called “governance 
functions”. These authors consider governance functions to be divisible among each other 
(McGinnis 2011; Oakerson and Parks 2011). The presumption is that aspects of governance 
such as provision, production, consumption, monitoring, and conflict resolution can be 
spread out across different levels and actors in public economies. Even if we presumed 
embeddedness into equal constitutional conditions, as a result of the first and second 
ontological conditions, we expect the way governance is organized to show great variations 
across cases.  
4.1.2 The normative constitutional conditions underlying polycentric governance 
The normative position refers to an idealized perspective on a social system which considers 
polycentric governance as desirable for the  performance features -described above. Its 
emergence depends on particular, idealized constitutional conditions which allow 
polycentric governance to emerge and which are addressed in this section (see also table 1). 
These relate to the formal and informal, constitutional, collective choice and meta-
constitutional rules within which society organizes governance. In the initial publication by V. 
Ostrom Tiebout and Warren (1961), these were only mentioned implicitly, and the 
underlying causal structure was not made explicit. Later on, Ostrom detailed ideas about 
normative assumptions or preconditions for polycentric governance to emerge. In this 
regard, he largely relies on the work of Polanyi (1953) (V. Ostrom 1999b). Aligica and Tarko 
(2012) reduce these constitutional rules to the enabling conditions for spontaneous self-
organization in the sense of freedom to organize, to enter into an organization or to leave it, 
and to voice contestation. Such prescriptions are to insure that public administrators’ actions 
and decisions are subject to legitimization by those that benefit from and pay for services 
(consumers, taxpayers). Concerning the overarching level into which polycentric governance 
is embedded, Ostrom and colleagues further state that “[g]overnments, […] can provide an 
appropriate institutional framework for the maintenance of polycentricity in various sectors 
of society, but an institutional framework which can uphold independent positions” does not 
apply to the organization of government itself (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 63). With 
this recognition, they posit the challenge of disentangling tasks that maintain polycentricity, 
which therefore cannot be organized in a polycentric fashion and tasks that are performed 
within the context of these preconditions. Hooghe and Marks, for example, suggested that 
distributional tasks and provision of non-excludable public goods would be best fulfilled by 
non-polycentric, national-level, multi-purpose governance arrangements (Hooghe and Marks 
2004). Another basic condition was that polycentricity was constituted not only in the 
provision of public goods and services, but also in other spheres of societal organization and 
functions such as the judicial system, constitutional rule, selection of political leadership and 
organization of political coalitions. If the constitutional provisions for polycentricity in any of 
these spheres was incomplete, polycentricity would not emerge or be maintainable because 
the tendency for evolutionary self-correction and self-regulation would be disturbed (V. 
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; van Zeben 2013). Further, important underlying meta-
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constitutional rules are incentives that make members of a society enforce general rules 
which frame the polycentric order.  
Table 1: Categories derived from the normative theory of polycentricity to characterize the 
polity  
Meta-norms 
Incentives for all members of a society to enforce general rules that frame the polycentric order.  
Availability of the conditions to formulate and revise basic rules of conduct in the polycentric system.  
Knowledge and reliability of societal rules, as well as access to knowledge about alternative rules and their 
outcomes.  
Normative orientations, where constitutional laws are violated, citizens must be willing to exercise civil 
disobedience.  
Legal and constitutional framework 
Market sphere  
Secure property rights and market orders (contract law, in the terms of Williamson 1985) that sanction 
contractual agreements.  
Judicial sphere  
Legal concepts and terms must be knowable, public, and intersubjectively applicable. Operable basis for 
judgment and principles for legal reasoning must be laid out. Interpretation of law must be subject to 
“contention among autonomous colleagues who are learned in the law” (Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 62).  
Political sphere 
Party system allows emergence of political entrepreneurs and provide incentives to reformers of party politics.  
Need for a culture of learning and entrepreneurship among political actors.  
Election laws need to be intact and existence of multiple constitutional decision rules in relation to selection of 
different actors. 
Constitution  
Independence of diverse decision-making units is upheld. Constitutional changes subject to extraordinary 
decision-making procedures. 
Decision-making capabilities are assigned among diverse decision structures of a government with 
independence of other decision structures. 
Concurrent regimes with overlapping jurisdictions must exist and constitutional limitations must be imposed 
upon governmental authorities.  
Limits to polycentricity in the organization of government and any society depend upon the services of some 
oligarchy to exercise ultimate authority.  
Source: own, based on Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; van Zeben 2013; Aligica and 
Tarko 2012; McGinnis 2005 
4.2 Positive polycentricity theory and the polycentricity framework  
Positive polycentricity theory is based on the normative theory as described above. It posits 
specific causes that help to explain governance structures, actors’ behavior and performance 
of governance. It sets out to empirically test the claims normative polycentricity theory 
makes. Examining the complex interrelations that normative polycentricity theory posits is 
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challenging. Thus, only few aspects have been addressed so far. The Ostroms themselves set 
out to test this theory in the sixties and seventies through work on local public economies, 
metropolitan governance and, more specifically, policing (cf. Parks and Oakerson 2000).  
The most prominent outflow of the research program on polycentric governance is the work 
concerning local collective action in the context of common pool resource management. It 
started to address the behavioral dimension only after the first publications on polycentric 
governance. Ostrom (1999c, 124) specifies: “[T]he critical variables [to understand behavior] 
of concern to scholars in the polycentric tradition include (1) individuals; (2) decision rules; 
(3) sets of events; (4) outcomes; and (5) measures of performance.” Openness with regards 
to motivations and behavior is also expressed by V. Ostrom (1999c, 125) 4 in claiming that 
“[o]nce we can conceptualize how individuals will choose strategies in light of the 
opportunities available to them in differently structured events with reference to different 
sets of decision rules, we can begin to specify the consequences for each set of 
permutations. We then have the necessary foundation for specifying the behavioral 
characteristics for aggregations of individuals who are organized into different types of 
collectivities.” There can be little doubt that later development and work on the behavioral 
dimensions of the IAD followed from this kind of reasoning. The theory underlying the IAD 
(which itself is not theories but a framework) relates to assumptions of purposive actors, 
their capacity to restructure institutions and methodological individualism. As a result, the 
behavioral dimension is included into the polycentricity framework (figure 1). Work on the 
IAD leads to the identification of design principles and further factors influencing collective 
action in local common pool resource settings (Ostrom 1990; 2005; 2007). Nevertheless, 
with its focus on local CPRs and mentioning polycentricity only in passing, for example 
through the design principle of nested institutions, it can be considered an 
operationalization of polycentricity for local common pool resources. On the whole, 
polycentricity opens up further research avenues. The resultant research program comprised 
of polycentricity addresses vertically and horizontally interlinked, autonomous but 
interrelated actors (Schoon, Robards, Meek and Galaz, 2015). Coupled with the conditions 
underlying the emergence of polycentric governance and its implications for performance of 
governance, a rich additional research agenda emerges (see figure 1). It is captured through 
the overall polycentricity approach, as depicted in figure 1. This consists of a normative and 
a positive theory underpinning the analysis of polycentric governance and in itself embodies 
an analytical framework that aims at corroborating either theory.  
To summarize this section functionalist, polycentric governance in this paper is 
conceptualized as a static structural description of governance. It is embedded in the 
polycentricity approach which highlights the foundational causes and normative 
preconditions for polycentric governance to emerge and the performance features that 
make it desirable (normative polycentricity theory), and the explanatory dimensions of 
(polycentric) governance (positive polycentricity theory). As neither the normative nor the 
                                                          
4 Initially published 1972. 
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positive theory have been sufficiently corroborated by empirical studies, the elements that 
are part of polycentricity theory are suggested as components of an analytical framework 
guiding future research. In what follows, we review how, over the last 15 years of research, 
the term polycentric governance has been used in the literature and what the principal 
findings were.  
Figure 1: The polycentricity approach entailing a normative and a positive theory and an 
analytical framework embedding polycentric governance 
 
Source: own, after Ostrom 1999c; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Ostrom 1999b; 
McGinnis 2005 
5 Mapping the last fifteen years of research on environmental governance 
and its relation to the polycentricity approach 
In the following, I revisit published work that relates to the polycentricity approach. 
Particularly, I selected work that makes use of the terms polycentricity or polycentric 
governance in studies on environmental governance. Articles have been sought through 
Web of Knowledge and Scopus for title, abstract or keywords, covering the  years 1999 
to2014. I selected 74 papers, most of which focus on theoretical elaboration or metropolitan 
governance. Twenty five papers actually address environmental governance and relate it to 
the terms polycentricity or polycentric governance.  
Articles that explicitly related to environmental governance were reviewed applying a loose 
meta-analysis. The review was structured with reference to the “conceptual instruments” of 
social science research introduced above. Hence, the question was, whether  and how work 
related to polycentricity or the polycentric governance concept - as theory or as framework. 
At the same time, I evaluated the outcomes of research in relation to polycentric governance 
and identified some gaps.  
5.1 Polycentric governance as ontological, operationalizing and sensitizing concept  
The majority of the papers reviewed rely on polycentric governance as a background 
concept, based on the same ontological presumptions concerning the way relations within 
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society are ordered as done by the polycentricity approach. Ontological acceptance of 
polycentric ordering of societal relations comes along with the recognition of the 
impossibility to do justice to the concomitant complexity in empirical research. Therefore, 
papers focus on particular aspects of polycentricity. In relation to the above-described ways 
of engaging with concepts, could be described as an ontological and sensitizing use of the 
concept of polycentricity.  
Heikkila and colleagues (2011) address the role of specific types of cross-scale or cross-level 
linkages between two or more actors in transboundary watershed management. Nagendra 
and Ostrom (2012) similarly address the interaction between actors at different levels of 
governance. They look at variation in management of forests. Marshall (2009) couches his 
analysis of conservation within the notion of polycentricity when he analyzes relations 
between communities of farmers and public agencies at lower levels. Basurto (2013) studies 
how multi-level institutional linkages (for example employment, membership, or different 
kinds of partnership) affect processes of local institutional change, such as emergence or 
robustness. Galaz and colleagues (2012) analyze marine governance. They specifically aim to 
conceptualize and uncover the content of relations in polycentric orders of governance in 
the international realm.  
In addition to an ontological and sensitizing use of the concept of polycentricity, some of the 
above papers extend use of the concept in an operationalizing fashion. Andersson and 
Ostrom (2008) operationalized vertical interlinkages of three types: frequency of interaction 
between local resource users and local governments, financial transfers between central and 
local governments, and upward political pressure for explaining commitment of local actors 
to invest into the governance of natural resources. Their results corroborate that a 
polycentric approach that enhances interactions and cross-level incentives between actors is 
an important determinant of local government interest in natural resource governance. 
Political as well as financial incentives seem to be of relevance in this regard. Heikkila and 
colleagues (2011) operationalize types of functional interlinkages in polycentric governance 
relying on Ostrom’s design principles. The resulting categorization shows similarities with 
what the Ostroms called governance functions (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; 
McGinnis 2011). They count occurrence of types of horizontal interlinkages and their 
relevance to governance functions and kinds of institutions (constitutional, collective choice, 
operational). They qualify the corresponding results by discussing relative importance of 
specific types of linkages, such as allocation, collective choice and monitoring rules. Sarker 
and colleagues (2014) do not explicitly address polycentricity but argue for an inclusion of 
state actors, multiple modes of governance and divergent policies into IAD analysis at the 
local level. Thus, they extend the IAD in conformance with the ontology of polycentricity. 
Galaz and colleagues (2012) address polycentricity from a network perspective. They 
characterize connections between actors at the international level through their degree of 
communication, formalization and network structures. For the international realm they 
highlight that connections are not only to serve coordination between actors but also to 
enable political influence.  
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To summarize this section, we can say that polycentric governance is mostly used as a 
concept to frame and sensitize research. Along with such use goes the analysts’ subscription 
to its ontological presumptions (variability of social problems and concomitant governance 
structures, heterogeneity of social collectives). Where analysts directly research polycentric 
governance, they predominantly address different types of horizontal and vertical 
interlinkages between actors intervening in governance. Where the performance of 
polycentric governance is evaluated, the concept is operationalized and specifically tested 
with regard to the adaptive capacity and flexibility of corresponding governance structures.  
5.2 Polycentric governance as positive, explanatory or normative, value-laden theory  
In this section, we will first look at publications that employed versions of what we call the 
polycentricity approach as positive, explanatory theories before we look at authors that 
employed it as normative, value-laden point of reference for evaluating the performance of 
environmental governance. Authors that employ polycentricity as positive theory usually 
explain governance without being very explicit about the causal relationships at play. 
Schlager and Blomquist (2008), for example, observe polycentric governance. They see it as 
result of overlapping arrangements where on the one hand, management units whose 
boundaries have been drawn in a technocratic manner are coupled with emerging forms of 
representation on the other in which communities invest into additional fora to articulate 
and protect their values and interests. Thiel (2013; forthcoming; Thiel and Egerton 2011) 
explains how constitutional state structures, as expressed in different roles of subnational 
units in either federal or unitary states, shape governance of marine resources and 
watersheds. Other authors couple the explanatory clout of theories they associate with 
polycentricity with critical approaches. Gruby and Basurto (2014) discuss the usefulness of 
complementing the polycentricity approach with approaches derived from critical human 
geography that address the politics of scale. Armitage’s work (2008) approaches 
polycentricity in a similar way and discusses the way normative principles derived from work 
on the commons and resilient governance become eventually operationalized in multi-level 
contexts of environmental governance ridden by power, discourses and diversity of 
knowledge about valuations and distributional implications. A similar conceptual ambition 
has been expressed by the work of Clement (2013).  
Examples of an application of normative polycentricity theory are claims about the role of 
polycentric governance for adaptive management, resilience and robustness (Anderies, 
Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). Pahl-Wostl (2008, 1) define adaptive management as “a 
systematic process for improving management policies and practices by learning from the 
outcomes of implemented management strategies” (cf.  Folke et al. 2005, 447). The 
underlying normative assumption is that polycentric governance allows for flexible coping 
with external drivers and that rapid change is enhanced by systems of governance that exist 
at multiple levels with some degree of autonomy, complemented by modest overlaps in 
authority and capability” (Folke et al. 2005, 460). Nagendra and Ostrom (2012, 115) go 
further in their normative claims when they write that “polycentric governance tends to 
reduce opportunistic behavior in forested and urban settings because the complexity of 
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many natural resources requires sophisticated multitier or polycentric governance systems 
rather than a reliance on a single type of level of governance” (McGinnis 1999, quoted by 
Nagendra and Ostrom 2012). Ostrom becomes even more explicit about the virtues of 
polycentric governance when she discusses climate mitigation. She states polycentric 
governance “tend[s] to enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of 
cooperation of participants and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and 
sustainable outcomes at multiple scales…” (2010c, 511; cf. Rayner and Jordan 2013; 
Sovacool 2011; da Silveira and Richards 2013). It helps to overcome opportunistic behavior, 
enhances face-to-face communication, and matching of ecosystem, institutional and social 
scales. Other authors raise claims that polycentric governance is more robust (Anderies and 
Janssen 2013), resilient (Garmestani and Benson 2013) and less vulnerable because of high 
degrees of overlaps and redundancy (Gupta et al. 2010).  
Sensitized by the normative propositions on polycentricity some authors try to measure the 
performance of governance that varies in relation to the degree of polycentricity. Da Silveira 
and Richards (2013), for example, look at what aspects of polycentricity make it beneficial to 
adaptive capacity. For the cases of the Rhine (Europe) and Pearl River (China) these authors 
conclude that internal power dynamics, competitive and collaborative patterns of 
interaction between multiple centers and emergence of functional and operational linkages 
among them are key to explain adaptive capacity. Similarly, Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014) 
examine the causal proposition that polycentricity renders governance more flexible and 
adaptive. From a QCA-based multiple comparative case study they conclude that polycentric 
governance regimes are more responsive to climate change than other, centralized or even 
fragmented types of governance arrangements and they, furthermore, discuss the role of 
external conditions such as economic performance for adaptive capacity. Often 
polycentricity is equated with the design principle of nested institutions (Huntjens et al. 
2012; Heikkila, Schlager, and Davis 2011) among Ostrom’s eight design principles (Ostrom 
2007). Corroborating such ideas, in their examination of adaptive capacity of watershed 
management in relation to climate change, Huntjens and colleagues (2012) found that 
adaptation to climate change relies on polycentric institutions which they consider crucial.  
Nevertheless, while the literature concludes with the many virtues of polycentric 
governance, also some drawbacks are mentioned. Thus, it is argued that distribution of 
governance functions across multiple decision-making centers decreases possibilities to 
realize economies of scale and scope in governance, making polycentric governance subject 
to high transaction costs (cf. McGinnis, 2005). Schoon et al (Schoon, Robards, Meek and 
Galaz, 2015) equate this with the need to balance redundancy and experimentation with 
concomitant inefficiencies and heightened transaction costs. Similarly, loss of democratic 
accountability of governance is expected not least because of the complexity of decision-
making processes (Lieberman, 2011), which may lead to advantages of powerful actors that 
manage to navigate the complexities of polycentric governance successfully. Furthermore, 
polycentric governance focusses on static structures of governance without giving much 
emphasis to the way they are enacted. The latter, however, may be decisive for performance 
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of governance (Schoon, Robards, Meek and Galaz, 2015). More fundamental, systemic 
critique is raised by Harvey (2010) who wonders about the way polycentric governance 
would address questions of redistribution.  
5.3 Polycentric governance as analytical framework 
 In the ontological and sensitizing tradition of the use of concepts, polycentricity has been 
used as an implicit framework in all above-cited studies. While Gruby and Basurto (2014, 50) 
explicitly referred to polycentricity as a “framework for analysis”, they did not spell out what 
the elements of such a framework would be. As a matter of fact, different frames of 
reference have been devised for analyzing aspects of polycentric governance, without 
precisely showing how these relate to the overarching polycentricity theory and framework, 
which this paper derived from the theoretical writings on the subject. Also, the IAD can be 
considered to be a framework analyzing particularly self-organisation at the local level, a key 
component of polycentric governance. Similarly, Lubell situates his work on the Ecology of 
Games in-between a framework and a positive theory inspired by and consistent with 
polycentricity and the IAD framework (Lubell 2013; Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010). He 
writes “the EG [Ecology of Games] framework intends to produce empirically testable 
hypotheses about structure and function of complex adaptive governance systems, analyze 
the causal processes driving individual behavior and institutional change and ultimately 
understand how different types of institutional arrangements are linked to policy outputs 
and outcomes…” (Lubell 2013, 513). It considers the role of cooperation, distribution and 
learning processes in governance which involve “multiple policy games operating 
simultaneously within a geographically defined policy arena, where a policy game consists of 
a set of policy actors participating in a rule-governed, collective decision making process” 
(Lubell 2013, 538). Applications of the EG approach (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010; 
Smaldino and Lubell 2011; Lubell, Robins, and Wang 2011; Berardo and Scholz 2010) focus 
on conceptualizing the internal workings and determinants of interdependent but 
autonomous actor constellations.  
Further, the Network’s of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS) approach, developed by 
McGinnis (2011) seeks to connect analyses of specific policy games or action situations using 
the IAD to the complexity within which they are situated from the perspective of 
polycentricity. It goes beyond the EG approach by referring to the dynamics between 
different levels of institutional analysis and governance functions and raises interest in the 
connections between the focal action situation and its context (McGinnis 2011, 58). 
However, this also begs the question of when we can call action situations adjacent. From 
the perspective of polycentricity this concerns the delineation of the public sector industry 
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1999a). McGinnis suggests reliance on the perspective of the agents 
involved in this regard. McGinnis himself illustrates how the approach helps to focus on key 
processes that determine outcomes. A first operationalization and detailing of linkages and 
their roles for focal action situations has been provided by Kimmich (2013) who studied the 
NAAS established by the role of energy (and its governance) for irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, 
India.  
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The frameworks discussed seem to confirm the focus of above cited studies inspired by an 
ontological understanding of polycentricity that focusses on cross-scalar and horizontal 
interlinkages between actors. They emphasize particular elements that establish structural, 
static polycentricity. In what follows, I want to further develop the notion of polycentricity as 
analytical framework. The purpose is to identify conceptual, methodological and knowledge 
gaps in research whose elaboration promises useful to expand and in that way deepen our 
understanding of environmental governance.  
On the whole, summarizing this section, we can observe that work on the use of polycentric 
governance for explaining change of institutions and governance relates to processes and 
channels of deliberation that actors have at their disposal in order to express their 
preferences. However, relatively little work has been done concerning which kinds of 
processes lead to polycentric governance in this regard and of what nature underlying 
conditions have. Value-driven (normative) statements about polycentric governance are 
abundant in the literature. Many have neither been substantiated for specific case studies 
nor on a more general level (Huitema et al. 2009; Anderies and Janssen 2013). Careful work 
in this regard is highly challenging. It highlights the need for an operationalization of types of 
polycentric governance which allows measuring performance (Schoon, Robards, Meek and 
Galaz, 2015). Disentangling causalities is specifically complex because of the 
comprehensiveness of Vincent Ostrom’s suggestions of what polycentric governance builds 
on and entails. However, in order to build a comprehensive research program, in this paper 
it is considered useful to view polycentric governance as a meta-analytical, highly abstract 
analytical framework that helps to connect theories and analytical frameworks that 
subscribe to related core assumptions . 
6 Discussion and conclusions: developing research based on an 
understanding of polycentric governance as analytical framework 
With regard to conceptual advances, the differentiation of structural polycentric governance 
has been developed furthest, specifically in respect of horizontal and vertical interlinkages. 
This becomes specifically clear when we look at the various conceptualizations of 
polycentricity as networks and interconnected games.  
Empirical knowledge creation and operationalization focuses on the way a polycentric 
ordering of public service entities influences the performance of overall governance. 
Research on co-management and co-production (Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012), 
the Ecology of Games (Lubell 2013, 513), Institutional Collective Action (Feiock 2013) and the 
Network of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS) illustrate ongoing developments in this field. 
Nevertheless, these significant advances, with regard to the study of the polycentric 
governance structures, require further differentiation as also confirmed by above-
mentioned authors working on this understanding of polycentricity.  
When we consider the broader polycentricity framework (figure 1) in order to identify 
research needs, we diagnose important research gaps in relation to the above-described 
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foundational elements of polycentricity: 1. constitutional rules, and 2. characteristics of 
social problems.With regard to constitutional rules, this refers to the operationalization of 
constitutionally catered opportunities regarding voice, exist and self-organization, and 
overarching rules within which polycentric governance is to develop.  Focusing on a) 
operationalizing constitutional and meta-constitutional rules underlying polycentric 
governance as well as b) spelling out their effects in specific constellations, both offer an 
exciting agenda for the study of (natural resource) governance.  
The relevance of such research becomes clear when we reflect on numerous comparative 
case studies of natural resource governance that include countries whose underlying 
constitutions largely differ. Illustrative in this regard is the study by da Silveira and Richards 
(2013) who discuss polycentricity of water governance in the cases of China and the EU. 
Questions also relate to studies that discuss polycentricity in international marine and 
natural resource governance (Gruby and Basurto 2014). At the very least, the question 
emerges how we should further develop and operationalize the constitutional conditions 
suggested by Vincent Ostrom over 40 years ago. For example, where formal rules 
significantly differ from the initial, normative propositions of the Ostroms, but where we can 
still observe polycentric, functional operation of governance, certain kinds of meta-
constitutional, informal rules may lead to polycentric governance.  
Furthermore, as regards overarching rules within which polycentric governance is supposed 
to develop, the question emerges what aspects and governance functions need to be 
regulated at the overarching level in a non-polycentric way, and what aspects can be 
organized in a polycentric fashion. For example, Hooghe and Marks (2004) seem to suggest 
that distributional tasks and provision of public goods should be taken up by overarching 
levels. This also highlights that more research needs to be invested in the role of 
characteristics of social problems for potentials of polycentric governance in order to 
evaluate this question. As a matter of fact, the characteristics of social problems are hardly 
addressed in research on natural resource governance. Research on local common pool 
resource management that has been developed by the Ostrom School has pointed out for 
long that the characteristics of resource systems and units largely differ and lead to a 
differentiated way in which they are addressed (Schlager and Blomquist 2008; Schlager, 
Blomquist, and Tang 1994; Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters 2002; Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 2009). 
Recently, this agenda has been detailed by institutional economists that transposed 
transaction cost economics to the analysis of what can be called nature-related transactions 
(Hagedorn 2008, see also Bougherara, Grolleau, and Mzoughi 2005; McCann 2013). Previous 
research addressed the role of characteristics of social problems such as mobility (Schlager 
and Ostrom 1992; Thiel, Schleyer, and Plieninger 2012), jointness (Falconer 2002), care 
intensity (Birner and Wittmer 2004) and the like. However, their impact on polycentric 
governance has not been addressed in a systematic fashion yet.  
Moving on along the polycentricity framework it becomes clear that, similarly, the link 
between polycentric governance structures and behavior of (public) agents has hardly been 
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addressed thus far. However, reading Skelcher (2005) and going back to the Ostroms (1999c) 
illustrates the relevance of such work. According to Skelcher (2005), the normative theory of 
polycentricity aims to introduce the behavioral logic of consequentiality into provision of 
public goods and services. It entails that “action arises from a calculation of expectations in 
relation to preferences” (Skelcher 2005, 102). Bureaucrats’ preferences may be related to 
policy output or outcomes in relation to a welfarist, societal perspective, or they may be 
directed at personal gain (Niskanen 1994; Mueller 2003). In contrast, specifically in the 
public sector, many analysts consider the logic of appropriateness to dominate, i.e. behavior 
that is oriented by rules, roles and tasks, rather than by outcomes (March and Olsen 1989; 
2004; Cohen, Olsen, and March 1972). Skelcher continues to write that “[t]he design of 
governance institutions for collective decisions in a polycentric environment needs to 
accommodate this tension” (Skelcher 2005, 102). He sees it as a result of the co-existence of 
general purpose and problem-oriented, specific purpose administrations within polycentric 
systems that, for functional reasons, need to relate to each other. Thus, also in polycentric 
systems it becomes necessary to balance the general interest reflected in administrative 
rule-following which is not contestable by individual consumers or members with interests 
of efficient provision articulated by purpose-oriented jurisdictions where under- or 
overprovision can be punished. Corresponding governance structures need “to be able to 
resolve collective action problems, to reflect and protect particular interest as well as the 
general will and not to necessitate a hierarchical equivalence of spatially defined 
jurisdictions” (Skelcher 2005, 104). As becomes evident from this elaboration, a rich research 
agenda couched in the polycentricity framework may address the way governance structures 
and their underlying foundations shape behavior of actors involved in governance. Such 
work could be developed through behavioral economic approaches which examine the 
behavioral effects of typologies of polycentric governance structures.  
Another research focus that the polycentricity framework points at and that has already 
been alluded to above concerns the performance of polycentric governance structures in 
relation to specific performance criteria. This becomes important because a multitude of 
new, sustainability-related performance criteria have been introduced such as robustness, 
resilience, flexibility, or vulnerability. The corresponding causal relations are theoretically 
and empirically unclear (cf. Anderies and Janssen 2013; Lubell 2013; Huitema et al. 2009). 
Detailed research on the effects of polycentric governance on each of them is missing thus 
far.   
Finally, I would suggest that we can also use normative polycentricity theory as a framework 
for focusing on causal relations between aggregate aspects. Hence, an interesting question 
concerns the role of specific sets of constitutional and meta-constitutional rules (e.g. 
varieties of capitalism) for innovative performance criteria concerning social-ecological 
systems such as, for example, resilience or robustness, or for the behavioral dimension of 
polycentric governance.  
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7 Summary 
In this paper, I have re-visited the original writings of the Ostroms on functionalist, 
polycentric governance and ordered them in relation to social scientific tools of research 
such as ontological, operationalizing and sensitizing concepts, as normative and positive 
theories, and as conceptual framework providing innovative outlooks on research. Based on 
the original normative theory of polycentricity, I suggest to understand polycentric 
governance as a research framework (or lens) on environmental governance which aims at 
providing a coherent understanding of the ontological and normative conditions underlying 
polycentricity and their implications for behavior of public service providers, and categories 
such as transactions costs, user satisfaction, efficiency or even resilience. A review of the 
literature on environmental governance that relates to polycentric governance proved that a 
distinction of the ways the term polycentricity is used helps to structure and interrelate 
research work related to polycentric governance. Further, understanding polycentric 
governance as an overarching analytical framework led to the identification of several 
research gaps: the operationalization and differentiation of a structural understanding of 
polycentric governance, the role of constitutional and meta-constitutional rules and social 
problem characteristics for polycentric governance, ways to distinguish the domain of 
overarching rules and the domain of polycentric governance, the way polycentric 
governance shapes agents’ behavior in acts of public service provision, and the relation 
between constitutional rules, polycentric governance structures and innovative criteria to 
evaluate social-ecological system performance. In the context of this assessment, recently 
renewed interest in polycentricity of environmental governance is welcome and promises 
exciting research. 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
22 
 
References 
Agrawal, A. 2001. "Common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources." 
World development 29 (10):1649–72. 
Aligica, P. D. 2006. "Institutional and Stakeholder Mapping: Frameworks for Policy Analysis 
and Institutional Change." Public Organization Review 6 (1):79–90. 
Aligică, P. D.. 2014. Institutional diversity and political economy. The Ostroms and beyond. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aligica, P. D.. and V. Tarko. 2012. "Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond." 
Governance- An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions 25 (2):237–
62. 
Anderies, J. M. and M. A. Janssen. 2013. "Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems: 
Implications for Public Policy." Policy Studies Journal 41 (3):513–36. 
Anderies, J. M., M. A. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2004. "A framework to analyze the robustness 
of social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective." Ecology and Society 9 (1). 
Anderies, J.M., Janssen, M.A., Ostrom, E., 2004. A framework to analyze the robustness of 
social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecology and Society 9 (1). 
Andersson, K.  P. and E. Ostrom. 2008. "Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a 
polycentric perspective." Policy Sciences 41 (1):71–93. 
Armitage, D. 2008. "Governance and the commons in a multi-level world." International 
Journal of the Commons 2 (1):7–32. 
Basurto, X.. 2013. "Linking multi-level governance to local common-pool resource theory 
using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis: Insights from twenty years of biodiversity 
conservation in Costa Rica." Global Environmental Change 23 (3):573–87. 
Berardo, R. and J. T. Scholz. 2010. "Self-organizing policy networks: risk, partner selection, 
and cooperation in estuaries." American Journal of Political Science 54 (3):632–49. 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
77954255825&partnerID=40&md5=04a8bf211ac39eee3961d75675609dc4. 
Biggs, R., M. Schlüter, and M. L. Schoon. Principles for building resilience: Sustaining 
ecosystem services in social-ecological systems. 
Birner, R. and H. Wittmer. 2004. "On the `efficient boundaries of the state‘: the contribution 
of transaction-costs economics to the analysis of decentralization and devolution in 
natural resource management." Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 22 
(5):667–85. 
Blaikie, N. W. H. 2000. Designing social research. The logic of anticipation. Malden, MA: 
Polity Press. 
Bougherara, D., G. Grolleau, and N. Mzoughi. 2005. "Can Williamson's analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives help regulators choose between alternative policy instruments." 
Cesaer Working Paper (2005/1). 
Clement, F.. 2013. "For critical social-ecological system studies: integrating power and 
discourses to move beyond the right institutional fit." Environmental Conservation 40 
(01):1–4. 
Cohen, M. D., J. P. Olsen, and J. G. March. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice." Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1):1–25. 
da Silveira, A. R. and K. S. Richards. 2013. "The Link Between Polycentrism and Adaptive 
Capacity in River Basin Governance Systems: Insights from the River Rhine and the 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
23 
 
Zhujiang (Pearl River) Basin." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103 
(2):319–29. 
Dahl, R. A. (1984) Polyarchy, Pluralism, and Scale. Scandinavian Political Studies. 7 (4): 225-
240 
Falconer, K. . 2002. "Developing Cooperative Approaches to Agri-environmental Policy: A 
Transaction Cost Perspective on Farmer Participation in Voluntary Schemes." In 
Environmental co-operation and institutional change. Theories and policies for European 
agriculture, ed. Konrad Hagedorn. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Feiock, R. C. 2013. "The Institutional Collective Action Framework." Policy Studies Journal 41 
(3):397–425. 
Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg. 2005. "Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological 
Systems." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30 (1):441–73. 
Galaz, V. , B. Crona, H. Österblom, P. Olsson, and C. Folke. 2012. "Polycentric systems and 
interacting planetary boundaries — Emerging governance of climate change–ocean 
acidification–marine biodiversity." Ecological Economics 81:21–32. 
Garmestani, A. S. and M. H. Benson. 2013. "A Framework for Resilience-based Governance 
of Social-Ecological Systems." Ecology and Society 18 (1). 
Giffinger, R. and J. Suitner. 2014. "Polycentric Metropolitan Development: From Structural 
Assessment to Processual Dimensions." European Planning Studies:1–18. 
Gruby, R.  L. and X. Basurto. 2014. "Multi-level governance for large marine commons: 
Politics and polycentricity in Palau's protected area network." Environmental Science & 
Policy 36:48–60. 
Gupta, J. , C. Termeer, J. Klostermann, S. Meijerink, M. van den Brink, P. Jong, S. Nooteboom, 
and E. Bergsma. 2010. "The Adaptive Capacity Wheel: a method to assess the inherent 
characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society." Environmental 
Science & Policy 13 (6):459–71. 
Hagedorn, K. , K. Arzt, and U. Peters. 2002. "Institutional Arrangement for Environmental Co-
operatives: a conceptual framework." In Environmental co-operation and institutional 
change, ed. K. Hagedorn. Cheltenham [u.a.]: Elgar, 3–25. 
Hagedorn, K.. 2008. "Particular requirements for institutional analysis in nature-related 
sectors (vol 35, pg 357, 2008)." European Review of Agricultural Economics 35 (4):357–84. 
Harvey, D., 2010. The Future of the Commons. Radical History Review 2011 (109), 101–107. 
Heikkila, T., E. Schlager, and M. W. Davis. 2011. "The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional 
Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Interstate River Compacts." 
Policy Studies Journal 39 (1):121–45. 
Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. “Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance.” In Multi-level 
governance. Edited by Ian Bache and Matthew V. Flinders. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., 2004. Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance, in: Bache, I., 
Flinders, M.V. (Eds.), Multi-level governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York. 
Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., Yalcin, R., 2009. 
Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-
)Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda. Ecology 
and Society 14 (1). 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
24 
 
Huitema, D., E. Mostert, W. E., S. Moellenkamp, C. Pahl-Wostl, and R. Yalcin. 2009. "Adaptive 
Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-
)Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda." Ecology 
and Society 14 (1). 
Huntjens, P. , L. Lebel, C. Pahl-Wostl, J. Camkin, R. Schulze, and N. Kranz. 2012. "Institutional 
design propositions for the governance of adaptation to climate change in the water 
sector." Global Environmental Change 22 (1):67–81. 
Kimmich, C.. 2013. "Linking action situations: Coordination, conflicts, and evolution in 
electricity provision for irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, India." Ecological Economics 90:150–
8. 
Lieberman, E.S., 2011. The perils of polycentric governance of infectious disease in South 
Africa. Social science & medicine (1982) 73 (5), 676–684. 
Lubell, M., A. D. Henry, and M. McCoy. 2010. "Collaborative institutions in an ecology of 
games." American Journal of Political Science 54 (2):287–300. 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
77954282820&partnerID=40&md5=f70cf0e7fa5fad5dcb4052ab8e866847. 
Lubell, M. N., Garry Robins, and Peng Wang. 2011. "Policy Coordination in an Ecology of 
Water Management Games." Southern Illinois University. 
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011. 
Lubell, M.. 2013. "Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework." 
Policy Studies Journal 41 (3):537–59. 
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of 
politics. New York: Free Press. 
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen. 2004. The logic of appropriateness. Arena Working Papers. 09. 
Marshall, G. R. 2009. "Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation 
practices under community-based governance." Ecological Economics 68 (5):1507–20. 
McCann, L.. 2013. "Transaction costs and environmental policy design." Ecological Economics 
88:253–62. 
McGinnis, M.D., 2005. Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance. Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin. Workshop on Analyzing Problems of Polycentric Governance in the 
Growing EU, 16 June 2005, Berlin. 
McGinnis, M.D., 2011. An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A 
Simple Guide to a Complex Framework. POLICY STUD J 39 (1), 169–183. 
McGinnis, M. D. 2005. "Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance." Berlin. 
McGinnis, M. D. 2011. "Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance." 
Policy Studies Journal 39 (1):45–72. 
McGinnis, M. D. and E. Ostrom. 2012. "Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration, 
and Polycentricity." Public Administration Review 72 (1):15–25. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02488.x. 
Mueller, D. C. 2003. Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Nagendra, H. and E. Ostrom. 2012. "Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested 
landscapes." International Journal of the Commons 6 (2):104–33. 
Niskanen, W. A. 1994. Bureaucracy and public economics. Aldershot, Hants, England, 
Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. Elgar. 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
25 
 
Oakerson, R. J. and R. B. Parks. 2011. "The Study of Local Public Economies: Multi-
organizational, Multi-level Institutional Analysis and Development." Policy Studies Journal 
39 (1):147–67. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
79951543313&partnerID=40&md5=ac2d75de29bab3f13702a82970777fb6. 
Oates, W.E., 1972. Fiscal federalism. The Harbrace series in business and economics. 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, NY, 256 pp. 
Ostrom, E., 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Political science. Princeton Univ. 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 355 pp. 
Ostrom, E. and G. P. Whitaker. 1999. "Community Control and Governmental 
Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Neighborhoods." In Polycentricity and local 
public economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. 
Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, E. and R. B. Parks. 1999. "Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures of 
Mixed Systems of Metropolitan Organization." In Polycentricity and local public 
economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. 
Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 284–305. 
Ostrom, E.. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E.. 1999a. "Size and Performance in a Federal System." In Polycentricity and local 
public economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. 
Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 232–62. 
Ostrom, E.. 2003. "How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action." 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (3):239–70. 
Ostrom, E.. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Ostrom, E.. 2007. "Collective Action Theory." In The Oxford handbook of comparative 
politics, eds. Carles Boix, and Susan Carol Stokes. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 185–208. 
Ostrom, E.. 2009. "A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological 
Systems." Science 325 (5939):419–22. 
Ostrom, E.. 2010a. "Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex 
economic systems." American Economic Review 100 (3):641–72.  
Ostrom, E.. 2010b. "Organizational economics: applications to metropolitan governance." 
Journal of Institutional Economics 6 (01):109. 
Ostrom, E.. 2010c. "Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 
environmental change." Global Environmental Change 20 (4):550–7. 
Ostrom, E.. 2012. "Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global 
solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?" Economic Theory 49 
(2):353–69. 
Ostrom, V. and E. Ostrom. 1999a. "A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental 
Relations." In Polycentricity and local public economies. Readings from the Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. M. D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Ostrom, V. and E. Ostrom. 1999b. "Public Goods and Public Choices." In Polycentricity and 
local public economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis, ed. M. D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 75–104. 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
26 
 
Ostrom, V., C. M. Tiebout, and R. Warren. 1961. "The organization of government in 
metropolitan areas - a theoretical inquiry." American Political Science Review 55 (4):831–
42. 
Ostrom, V.. 1980. "Artisanship and Artifact." Public Administration Review 40 (4):309–17. 
Ostrom, V.. 1999b. "Polycentricity (Part 1)." In Polycentricity and local public economies. 
Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. M. D. McGinnis. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 52–74. 
Ostrom, V.. 1999c. "Polycentricity (Part 2)." In Polycentricity and local public economies. 
Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. M. D. McGinnis. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 119–38. 
Paavola, J., 2007. Institutions and environmental governance: A reconceptualization. 
Ecological Economics 63 (1), 93–103. 
Pahl-Wostl, C., Knieper, C., 2014. The capacity of water governance to deal with the climate 
change adaptation challenge: Using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to 
distinguish between polycentric, fragmented and centralized regimes. Global 
Environmental Change (29): 139–154. 
Parks, R. B. and R. J. Oakerson. 2000. "Regionalism, Localism, and Metropolitan Governance: 
Suggestions from the Research Program on Local Public Economies." State & Local 
Government Review 32 (3):169–79. 
Pahl-Wostl, C. 2008. "Requirements for Adaptive Water Management." In Adaptive and 
Integrated Water Management, eds. C. Pahl-Wostl, P. Kabat, and J. Möltgen. Berlin: 
Springer, 1–22. 
Polanyi, K.. 1953. Semantics of general economic history (revised). [New York]. 
Putnam, R.D., 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics - The Logic of 2-Level Games. 
International Organization 42 (3), 427–460. 
Rayner, T. and A. Jordan. 2013. "The European Union: the polycentric climate policy leader?" 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 4 (2):75–90. 
Rhodes, R. A. W, 1995. The New governance: Governing without governance. ESRC. 
Sarker, A., Tadao I., R. Kada, T. Abe, M. Nakashima, and G. Herath. 2014. "User self-
governance in a complex policy design for managing water commons in Japan." Journal of 
Hydrology 510:246–58. 
Scharpf, F.W., 1997. Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy 
research. Theoretical lenses on public policy. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 318 pp. 
Schlager, E., W. Blomquist, and S. Y. Tang. 1994. "Mobile flows, storage, and self-organized 
institutions for governing common-pool resources." Land Economics 70 (3):294–317. 
Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom. 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis." Land Economics 68 (3):249–62. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3146375. 
Schlager, E. and W. A Blomquist. 2008. Embracing watershed politics. Boulder, Colo: 
University Press of Colorado. 
Schlager, E.. 1999. "A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes." 
In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P. A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Skelcher, C. 2005. "Jurisdictional integrity, polycentrism, and the design of democratic 
governance." Governance- An international Journal of Policy and Administration 18 
(1):89–110. 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2016-1 
 
27 
 
Smaldino, P. E. and M. Lubell. 2011. "An institutional mechanism for assortment in an 
ecology of games." PLoS ONE 6 (8). http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-
s2.0-79961158100&partnerID=40&md5=37d2a30be789640853ea7a500b3c4422. 
Sovacool, B. K. 2011. "An international comparison of four polycentric approaches to climate 
and energy governance." Energy Policy 39 (6):3832–44. 
Sproule-Jones, M. 2002. "Institutional experiments in the restoration of the North American 
Great Lakes environment." Canadian Journal of Political Science 35 (4):835–57. 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
0037652286&partnerID=40&md5=9eb1691125b3865c0e5dbf2a86c4a3cb. 
Thiel, A. and C. Egerton. 2011. "Re-scaling of resource governance as institutional change: 
the case of water governance in Portugal." Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 54 (3):383–402. 
Thiel, A., C. Schleyer, and T. Plieninger. 2012. "Wolves are Mobile, While Fruit Trees are not! 
How Characteristics of Resources and Supranational Regulatory Frameworks Shape the 
Provision of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in Germany." Environmental Policy and 
Governance 22 (3):189–204. 
Thiel, A. . 2013. "Scalar reorganisation of marine governance in Europe? The implementation 
of the marine strategy framework directive in Spain, Portugal and Germany." Marine 
Policy 39:322–32. 
Thiel, A.. 2014. "Rescaling of Resource Governance as Institutional Change: Explaining the 
Transformation of Water Governance in Southern Spain." Environmental Policy and 
Governance:n/a. 
van Zeben, J. A. W. 2013. Research Agenda For a Polycentric European Union. Working Paper 
Series. W13-13. The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis. Bloomington. 
Vatn, A. 2005. Institutions and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Verschuere, B., T. Brandsen, and V. Pestoff. 2012. "Co-production: The State of the Art in 
Research and the Future Agenda." VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations 23 (4):1083–101. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: Free Pr. [u.a.]. 
 
 
 
Joining minds for sustainable pathways
At IRI THESys, the Integrative Research Institute on Transformations 
of Human-Environment Systems, scientists from humanities, social 
and natural sciences collaborate to solve interdisciplinary research 
questions related to the societal challenges of transforming human-
environment systems.
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
IRI THESys 
Unter den Linden 6
10099 Berlin 
Offices: Friedrichstr. 191, 10117 Berlin
 
www.iri-thesys.org
